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Research Article
When the prolific sports agent Leigh Steinberg signed 
rookie Steve Bartkowski as his first client in 1975, he 
soon learned that negotiating a contract in the National 
Football League would be a challenge because Bartkowski 
had no alternatives. Steinberg, the inspiration behind the 
movie Jerry Maguire, recently recalled that his client 
“would be forced to accept the team’s best offer. He 
could play quarterback for the Atlanta Falcons or play for 
no one” (Steinberg & Arkush, 2014, p. 43). Despite being 
virtually powerless in the negotiations, Steinberg made a 
bold move when he made the first official offer of 
$750,000: “We are asking for the largest amount of money 
any football player has ever been given” (p. 46). The 
Atlanta Falcons were outraged by Steinberg’s exorbitant 
request but eventually agreed to sign Bartkowski for 
$600,000, the most a rookie had received in the league’s 
history.
This example illustrates the surprising fact that nego-
tiators who lack viable alternatives can achieve profitable 
agreements and stands in stark contrast to the advice that 
researchers and practitioners give to negotiators: to 
always secure an alternative (Malhotra & Bazerman, 2007; 
Thompson, 2011). It is widely recommended that nego-
tiators establish alternatives because doing so gives them 
the power to extract more concessions from their oppo-
nents. Indeed, experimental research demonstrates that 
negotiators with better alternatives end up with superior 
outcomes because they can demand more (Kim, Pinkley, 
& Fragale, 2005; Mannix & Neale, 1993).
We challenge the widely held assumption that alterna-
tives are necessarily beneficial and propose that the 
advice to secure an alternative can paradoxically have 
detrimental consequences. Drawing on research on 
anchoring effects, we hypothesize that someone with no 
alternatives (no power) can secure better outcomes than 
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Abstract
The current research shows that having no power can be better than having a little power. Negotiators prefer having 
some power (weak negotiation alternatives) to having no power (no alternatives). We challenge this belief that having 
any alternative is beneficial by demonstrating that weak alternatives create low anchors that reduce the value of first 
offers. In contrast, having no alternatives is liberating because there is no anchor to weigh down first offers. In our 
experiments, negotiators with no alternatives felt less powerful but made higher first offers and secured superior 
outcomes compared with negotiators who had weak alternatives. We established the role of anchoring through 
mediation by first offers and through moderation by showing that weak alternatives no longer led to worse outcomes 
when negotiators focused on a countervailing anchor or when negotiators faced an opponent with a strong alternative. 
These results demonstrate that anchors can have larger effects than feelings of power. Absolute powerlessness can be 
psychologically liberating.
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someone with a weak alternative (little power) because 
weak alternatives serve as low anchors that reduce the 
value of first offers. Such a finding would imply that (a) 
having no power can be better than having a little power 
and (b) anchor values can matter more than feelings of 
power in predicting negotiated outcomes.
Alternatives in Negotiations
Securing alternatives appears to provide a well- established 
advantage. One’s BATNA, or Best Alternative To a 
Negotiated Agreement (Fisher & Ury, 1981), is tied to one’s 
power. The better the best alternative, the more power one 
has because one is less dependent on a particular negotia-
tion to achieve one’s goals. Negotiators with alternatives 
have higher aspirations, make larger initial demands, and 
claim more value than negotiators with no alternatives 
(see Thompson, Wang, & Gunia, 2010, for a review).
To test whether negotiators also prefer to have an 
alternative rather than no alternative, we asked 101 
Mechanical Turk participants whether they preferred 
negotiating a job offer with a relatively unattractive alter-
native or with no alternative at all (see the Supplemental 
Material available online). An overwhelming majority 
(92.08%) chose to have a weak BATNA over no BATNA, 
preferring to have a little power rather than no power 
(see Handgraaf, Van Dijk, Vermunt, Wilke, & De Dreu, 
2008, for similar findings in ultimatum games).
In the current research, we examined whether having 
a little power is actually better than having no power. 
Prior research has not answered this question because the 
comparisons have been between negotiators with attrac-
tive and unattractive BATNAs (Kim & Fragale, 2005) or 
between negotiators with attractive BATNAs and with no 
BATNA (Magee, Galinsky, & Gruenfeld, 2007; Van Kleef, 
De Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead, 2006). As a result, it is not 
known how having unattractive alternatives, in compari-
son with having no alternatives, influences negotiators.
Anchoring and the Liberating Effect of 
Having No Alternatives
Although alternatives make negotiators feel powerful, the 
value of an alternative also serves as a salient anchor. We 
propose that the anchoring value of BATNAs can matter 
more than feelings of power in predicting negotiated 
outcomes.
Anchoring constitutes the assimilation of a judgment 
to a relevant or irrelevant numeric value (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). Anchors have robust effects on eco-
nomic outcomes and judicial verdicts (Englich, 
Mussweiler, & Strack, 2006; Northcraft & Neale, 1987). 
BATNAs can function as dominant anchor points. For 
instance, a BATNA determines a negotiator’s reservation 
price (the bottom line), which has a strong impact on the 
final agreement (Blount, Thomas-Hunt, & Neale, 1996).
We propose that negotiators are likely to use their 
BATNAs to determine the size of their first offers. Thus, 
weak alternatives may serve as low anchors that limit the 
size of first offers. Recall the football negotiation with 
which we opened this article: If Bartkowski had had an 
alternative offer of only $100,000, his offer to the Atlanta 
Falcons might have been much lower than the $750,000 
he proposed. In contrast, not having an alternative might 
protect a negotiator from being anchored on a low value. 
Accordingly, we predicted that negotiators without a 
BATNA would make higher first offers than those with a 
weak BATNA because there would be no anchor to 
weigh their first offer down.
The anchoring effect of BATNAs on first offers is 
important because the size of first offers has a strong 
impact on final agreements (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 
2001; Gunia, Swaab, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2013; 
Sinaceur, Maddux, Vasiljevic, Nückel, & Galinsky, 2013); 
aggressive first offers produce larger profits (Galinsky, 
Ku, & Mussweiler, 2009). We predicted that negotiators 
without alternatives would achieve more profitable 
agreements than negotiators with unattractive alterna-
tives because without an anchor weighing them down, 
negotiators without alternatives would make more 
aggressive first offers.
Overview of the Experiments
We hypothesized an ironic effect of having no power: 
Negotiators with no BATNA would feel less powerful but 
make more aggressive first offers than those with weak 
BATNAs. That is, we predicted that the anchor value of 
alternatives would matter more than the feelings of power 
they induced. In our first experiment, we demonstrated 
that BATNAs influence first offers (Experiment 1). We then 
established the critical role of anchoring processes in the 
influence of BATNAs on final agreements by demonstrat-
ing mediation by first offers (Experiments 2 and 3) and 
moderation by whether negotiators focused on an alterna-
tive anchor (Experiment 3) or by the strength of an oppo-
nent’s BATNA (Experiment 4). All experiments were 
confirmatory studies. We report all conditions and excluded 
observations. Sample size was determined in advance.
The present studies make a number of important theo-
retical contributions. First, they demonstrate that, contrary 
to lay beliefs, having no power can be better than having 
a little power: Having no alternatives can psychologically 
liberate negotiators from the constraints that low anchors 
impose on first offers. Second, our work shows that 
anchoring effects can matter more than power in negotia-
tions. Third, our finding that powerlessness can lead 
negotiators to demand more from their opponents extends 
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prior research which found that people without any 
power are treated more sympathetically and generously 
than those with little power (Handgraaf et al., 2008).
Experiment 1: BATNAs Influence  
First Offers
In our first experiment, which comprised two separate 
studies, we manipulated whether negotiators had no, 
weak, or strong alternatives. We predicted that negotiators 
without alternatives would feel less powerful but make 
higher first offers than those with weak alternatives.
Experiment 1a
Participants and design. Three hundred five individ-
uals (mean age = 30.50 years, SD = 9.27; 37.7% female) 
were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk in 
exchange for $0.50 and were randomly assigned to a no-, 
weak-, or strong-BATNA condition.
We excluded participants who had duplicate IP 
(Internet protocol) addresses or who responded incor-
rectly to an attention check. We also excluded partici-
pants who made first offers with extreme values (i.e., > 3 
SD from the mean; McClelland, 2000). Seventeen partici-
pants were excluded for meeting one or more of these 
criteria, which left a final sample of 288.
Procedure. Participants were told to imagine that they 
had recently purchased a digital music player and there-
fore wanted to sell one of their old CDs. They were also 
given information about the quality of the CD (used but 
in reasonably good condition, with no scratches and an 
intact case). Then, they were informed that a potential 
buyer asked them for an initial offer. In the no-BATNA 
condition, participants were told: “Nobody else has 
offered you money for the CD. Thus, if you can’t reach an 
agreement in the current negotiation, you won’t get any 
money for the CD.” In the weak-BATNA condition, par-
ticipants read: “Another buyer has offered you $2 for the 
CD. Thus, if you can’t reach an agreement in the current 
negotiation, you will get $2 for the CD.” Instructions were 
identical in the strong-BATNA condition, but the alterna-
tive offer was $8 instead of $2.
Immediately after the BATNA manipulation, partici-
pants were instructed to make the first offer, which was 
our key dependent measure. Then, the negotiation was 
terminated, and participants were asked to indicate the 
extent to which they felt powerful (1 = powerless, 7 = 
powerful), in control (1 = no control, 7 = in control), 
strong (1 = weak, 7 = strong), and confident (1 = uncon-
fident, 7 = confident). Responses to these four items were 
averaged to create a single measure of perceived power 
(α = .92). Finally, participants completed an attention 
check (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009) and 
provided demographic information.
Results
Perceived power. We predicted that no-BATNA partici-
pants would feel the least powerful. That is exactly what 
we found (see Fig. 1). Negotiators with no BATNA (M = 
4.80, SD = 1.03, 95% confidence interval, or CI = [4.59, 
5.01]) felt less powerful than negotiators in both other 
conditions, ts(285) > 3.05, ps < .003, ds > 0.42. In addi-
tion, those with a weak BATNA (M = 5.25, SD = 1.09, 
95% CI = [5.03, 5.47]) felt less powerful than those with a 
strong BATNA (M = 5.75, SD = 0.96, 95% CI = [5.55, 5.95]), 
t(285) = 3.34, p < .001, d = 0.49.
First offers. We also predicted that participants with a 
weak BATNA would make the lowest first offers, and we 
found that as well (see Fig. 1). Negotiators with a weak 
BATNA (M = $4.57, SD = 1.74, 95% CI = [4.33, 4.92]) made 
lower offers than negotiators in both other conditions, 
ts(285) > 6.18, ps < .001, ds > 0.76. Negotiators with a 
strong BATNA (M = $11.02, SD = 1.90, 95% CI = [10.63, 
11.42]) made higher first offers than negotiators with no 
BATNA (M = $7.61, SD = 5.33, 95% CI = [6.54, 8.68]), 
t(285) = 6.83, p < .001, d = 0.85.
Thus, even though negotiators without alternatives felt 
less powerful than negotiators with unattractive alterna-
tives, they made higher first offers.
Experiment 1b
In Experiment 1b, we used the same design as in 
Experiment 1a except that we included an ambiguous-
BATNA condition to test whether the framing of the 
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Fig. 1. Results from Experiment 1a: mean first-offer amount (bars) and 
perceived power (lines) as a function of condition. Error bars indicate 
±1 SEM. BATNA = best alternative to a negotiated agreement.
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no-BATNA condition mattered. We also provided partici-
pants with several reference points to better correspond 
with the fact that negotiators have various sources of infor-
mation available when making offers (Blount et al., 1996).
Participants and design. We recruited 204 individu-
als (mean age = 30.89 years, SD = 10.12; 30.9% female) 
from Mechanical Turk in exchange for $0.70 and ran-
domly assigned them to the ambiguous-, no-, weak-, and 
strong-BATNA conditions. Nineteen participants were 
excluded using the same criteria as in Experiment 1a.
Procedure. Participants took the role of a job applicant 
and were asked to imagine that they had been invited for 
a job interview, that they had aced the interview, that the 
firm had extended a job offer, and that the only remain-
ing issue was the salary. They were further asked to 
imagine that the human-resources representative had 
asked them for an initial offer for their desired salary. All 
participants were given salary estimates from a fictitious 
industry report indicating that for comparable positions, 
the salary range was from $30,000 to $80,000 and the 
mean was $60,000.
Participants in the ambiguous-BATNA condition were 
given no additional information. In the no-BATNA condi-
tion, participants read: “You do not have any alternative 
offers and you do not expect more to come.” Instructions 
in the weak-BATNA condition read: “A recruiter from a 
comparable firm has made you an offer with an overall 
value of $40,000.” Instructions in the strong-BATNA con-
dition were identical except that the alternative offer was 
$70,000.
Immediately following the BATNA manipulation, par-
ticipants were asked to make the first offer (our key 
dependent measure) and to complete the same four power 
items (α = .93) and attention check as in Experiment 1a.
Results
Perceived power. We predicted that no-BATNA partici-
pants would feel less powerful than participants with a 
BATNA. That is exactly what we found. Negotiators with 
no BATNA (M = 4.76, SD = 1.35, 95% CI = [4.37, 5.14]) 
felt less powerful than those with a weak BATNA (M = 
5.30, SD = 1.07, 95% CI = [4.97, 5.62]), t(181) = 2.30, 
p = .023, d = 0.44, and less powerful than those with a 
strong BATNA (M = 5.69, SD = 0.94, 95% CI = [5.42, 5.96]), 
t(285) = 4.10, p < .001, d = 0.81 (see Fig. 2). Participants 
with a weak BATNA felt less powerful than those with a 
strong BATNA, but this difference was only marginally 
significant, t(285) = 1.69, p = .094, d = 0.40. Perceived 
power in the ambiguous-BATNA condition (M = 5.12, 
SD = 1.15, 95% CI = [4.76, 5.48]) differed from perceived 
power in the strong-BATNA condition, t(285) = 2.40, p = 
.018, d = 0.55, but did not differ from perceived power in 
the weak- and no-BATNA conditions (ps > .12).
First offers. We predicted that first offers would be the 
lowest in the weak-BATNA condition, and that is exactly 
what we found. Negotiators with a weak BATNA (M = 
$54,705, SD = 9,967, 95% CI = [51,674, 57,735]) made 
lower first offers than negotiators in all other conditions, 
ts(285) > 2.47, ps < .014, ds > 0.50 (see Fig. 2). Nego-
tiators with a strong BATNA (M = $74,633, SD = 5,855, 
95% CI = [72,951, 76,314]) made higher first offers than 
negotiators in the no-BATNA condition (M = $59,610, 
SD = 9,451, 95% CI = [56,924, 62,295]), t(285) = 7.79, 
p < .001, d = 1.91, and those in the ambiguous-BATNA 
condition (M = $60,762, SD = 12,470, 95% CI = [56,875, 
64,648]), t(285) = 6.87, p < .001, d = 1.46. The no-BATNA 
and ambiguous-BATNA conditions did not differ, p = .56. 
Thus, the framing of the no-BATNA condition did not 
drive the observed effects.
Discussion
Experiment 1 demonstrated that negotiators without a 
BATNA made higher first offers than negotiators with a 
weak BATNA even though they felt less powerful. The 
anchor value of alternatives mattered more than the feel-
ings of power they activated.
Experiment 2: Final Agreements and 
Mediation by First-Offer Amount
Experiment 2 involved an interactive negotiation. We 
predicted that negotiators without an alternative would 
reach more profitable agreements than those with a weak 
alternative and that this effect would be mediated by the 
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size of the first offer. Also, to address the concern that 
participants in Experiment 1 may have taken the anchor 
provided by the experimenter as a signal of the true 
value, we used a negotiation item about which all partici-
pants had market knowledge. A confederate provided 
the alternative, to increase realism.
Participants and design
Participants were French students who demonstrated 
market knowledge of the negotiation item, a Starbucks 
logo mug. Potential participants were invited to partici-
pate in an online screening survey that ostensibly tested 
their Internet skills. The survey required them to search 
the price of the mug at the Starbucks online store. To 
disguise the purpose of the survey, we included two 
additional products to be researched. Only the 100 stu-
dents (mean age = 22.47 years, SD = 3.08; 62.0% female) 
who correctly identified the retail price of the mug (€8.90) 
were invited to participate in the laboratory study in 
exchange for €5. At the lab several days later, participants 
were assigned to the role of either the seller or the buyer. 
The 50 dyads were then randomly assigned to either a 
no-BATNA or a weak-BATNA condition.
Although all dyads reached an agreement, seven dyads 
were excluded from analyses because the seller or buyer 
(or both) failed to correctly recall the retail price of the 
mug upon completion of the study. An additional dyad 
was excluded because their reported first offer was more 
than 3 standard deviations from the mean. All analyses 
were conducted on the remaining 42 dyads.
Procedure
BATNA manipulation. Upon arrival at the laboratory, 
participants were seated in separate cubicles, where 
they read their individual instructions. Sellers were 
endowed with a Starbucks logo mug. Buyers were told 
that they were about to meet the seller of a mug; sellers 
were told that before they entered the face-to-face meet-
ing with the buyer (Buyer B), they would receive a 
phone call from another buyer (Buyer A, played by a 
male confederate), which might give them some lever-
age in the negotiation with Buyer B. To make sure that 
the confederate role was credible, we invited at least 4 
to 6 participants to the lab at the same time and informed 
them that several other participants were delayed and 
would arrive shortly. Sellers were called by the confed-
erate while in their individual cubicles. The confederate 
randomly communicated one of two statements and 
then hung up immediately. In the no-BATNA condition, 
the confederate said: “Hi, I’m Buyer A, and I promised 
to call back about the coffee mug you are offering. I’m 
not interested in your mug, and I cannot make you an 
offer for the mug. Have a nice day.” In the low-BATNA 
condition, the confederate said: “Hi, I’m Buyer A, and I 
promised to call back about the coffee mug you are 
offering. I’m interested in your mug, and my offer for 
your mug is €1.50. I’m unable to pay more than €1.50. 
Have a nice day.”
Negotiation. Following the phone conversation with 
Buyer A (the confederate), each seller was accompanied 
by a research assistant to the cubicle of Buyer B (another 
participant), where the buyer and seller were seated at a 
table and negotiated face-to-face. The seller was then 
instructed to make the first offer and to negotiate with 
Buyer B until they reached an agreement over the sales 
price of the mug.
Measures. After the negotiations, sellers indicated how 
powerful they had felt immediately after the phone con-
versation with Buyer A, using the same four power items 
as in Experiment 1 (α = .82). Both buyers and sellers 
reported the seller’s first offer and the final agreement 
amount, which served as our key dependent measures. 
Finally, all participants were asked to report demographic 
information and to choose from a set of three options 
(€2.90, €8.90, €16.90) the retail price of the mug accord-
ing to their research during the prelab survey.
Results
Perceived power. As we predicted, negotiators with no 
BATNA (M = 3.51, SD = 1.03, 95% CI = [3.02, 4.01]) felt 
less powerful than those with a weak BATNA (M = 4.32, 
SD = 1.26, 95% CI = [3.77, 4.86]), t(40) = 2.22, p = .032, 
d = 0.70 (see Fig. 3).
First offers. Also as predicted, negotiators in the no-
BATNA condition (M = €10.94, SD = 4.25, 95% CI = [8.89, 
12.99]) made higher first offers than those in the weak-
BATNA condition (M = €4.39, SD = 2.17, 95% CI = [3.45, 
5.33]), t(40) = 6.46, p < .001, d = 1.94.
Final agreements. Similarly, we expected no-BATNA 
participants to negotiate more profitable agreements than 
weak-BATNA participants. Indeed, negotiators with no 
BATNA (M = €7.79, SD = 3.19, 95% CI = [6.26, 9.33]) 
negotiated better agreements than those with a weak 
BATNA (M = €3.73, SD = 1.82, 95% CI = [2.95, 4.52]), 
t(40) = 5.18, p < .001, d = 1.56 (see Fig. 3).
Mediation analysis. We predicted that sellers with no 
BATNA would negotiate more profitable agreements than 
those with a weak BATNA because they made higher first 
offers. In a process analysis using a bootstrapping proce-
dure with 5,000 iterations (Hayes, 2013), we designated 
 at INSEAD - Library on February 9, 2015pss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
When Powerlessness Liberates 175
the seller’s BATNA as the independent variable (weak 
BATNA = 0; no BATNA = 1), the seller’s first offer as the 
mediator, and the amount of the final agreement as the 
dependent variable. As predicted, the amount of the first 
offer mediated the effect of the negotiator’s BATNA on 
the size of the final negotiated price, 95% CI = [3.21, 6.49] 
(see Fig. 4).
Discussion
Experiment 2 demonstrates that having no alternative 
leads to more profitable agreements than having a 
weak alternative and that first-offer amount mediates 
this relationship. This study also establishes external 
validity of the observed effects, as all negotiators had 
market knowledge of the negotiation item and the 
BATNA was provided by another person rather than the 
experimenter.
Experiment 3: Leveling the  
Playing Field
Experiment 3 also involved an interactive negotiation. In 
this experiment, we used moderation to further test 
whether anchoring drove the observed effects. Specifically, 
we manipulated whether negotiators focused on a coun-
tervailing anchor. Galinsky and Mussweiler (2001) dem-
onstrated that focusing on the countervailing anchor of 
one’s target price eliminates the anchoring effect of the 
first offer. We predicted that negotiators would be less 
anchored on a weak alternative when they focused on 
their target price.
Participants and design
Two hundred eighty-six French students (mean age = 
22.99 years, SD = 2.83; 57.0% female) were recruited to 
participate in a laboratory study in exchange for €5. The 
143 dyads were randomly assigned to six conditions in a 
3 (BATNA: no vs. weak vs. strong) × 2 (focus: BATNA vs. 
target price) between-subjects design.
Although all dyads reached an agreement, 2 dyads did 
not follow the instructions regarding who was to make 
the first offer, and 2 dyads reported first offers that fell 
more than 3 standard deviations from the mean. These 
four dyads were dropped from the analyses. Thus, all 
analyses were conducted on the remaining 139 dyads.
Procedure
Upon arrival at the laboratory, each dyad was seated in 
an individual room and received their role materials. The 
scenario involved an antique dealer (the seller) and a col-
lector (the buyer) negotiating the sales price for a sugar 
bowl (Paulson, 2014). All sellers were informed that they 
had originally purchased the sugar bowl for another cli-
ent who had been willing to pay €600 but ultimately 
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refused to accept the bowl because it had a defect. Sellers 
were also told that the market value for sugar bowls var-
ies widely and can range up to €1,000.
Manipulations. BATNAs were manipulated similarly 
to the way they were manipulated in Experiment 1. 
Because past research suggests that making the first offer 
is equally effective for sellers and buyers (Galinsky & 
Mussweiler, 2001; Gunia et  al., 2013; Moran & Ritov, 
2002), we always instructed sellers to move first. Sellers 
in the no-BATNA condition were told that no one else 
had made them an offer, that they should not expect any 
more offers to come, and that they would earn no money 
if they did not reach an agreement. Sellers in the weak-
BATNA condition were told that another buyer had 
offered them €45 for the bowl and that they would earn 
this amount if they did not reach an agreement. The 
instructions in the strong-BATNA condition were identical 
except that the BATNA value was €450.
Following the BATNA manipulation, sellers received 
an additional page of information, titled “Important Seller 
Information,” that instructed them to focus on either their 
BATNA or their target price (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 
2001). The BATNA-focus instructions read, “When prepar-
ing for your negotiation it is important to think about and 
focus on the alternatives that you have to this negotiated 
agreement. A clear understanding of these alternatives 
will assist you in preparing for the negotiation.” The 
 target-price-focus instructions read, “When preparing 
your negotiation it is important to think about and focus 
on your target, the ideal price at which you could sell. A 
clear understanding of this price will assist you in prepar-
ing for the negotiation.”
Because both manipulations were directed at sellers, 
all buyers received identical instructions and were told 
that they should pay no more than €3,000 for the bowl.
Measures. After reading the role instructions but before 
the first offer was made, sellers were asked to complete 
the same four power measures as in Experiments 1 and 2 
(α = .86). When the negotiation was completed, partici-
pants reported the value of the first offer made by the 
seller and the amount of the final agreement, which 
served as our key dependent measures.1 Finally, all par-
ticipants reported demographic information.
Results
Perceived power. Results for the BATNA-focus condi-
tion were consistent with the results in Experiments 1 
and 2. When negotiators focused on their BATNA, those 
with no BATNA felt the least powerful, those with a weak 
BATNA felt more powerful, and those with a strong 
BATNA felt most powerful (see Table 1). There was a 
significant difference between the no- and strong-BATNA 
conditions, but the weak-BATNA condition did not differ 
from the other two. However, when negotiators focused 
on their target, there were no differences among the no-
BATNA, weak-BATNA, and strong-BATNA conditions 
(ps > .41; see Table 1).
First offers. We predicted that negotiators who had 
weak BATNAs and who focused on their BATNA would 
make lower first offers than negotiators in each of the 
other conditions. In contrast, we expected that negotia-
tors who had weak BATNAs but focused on their target 
price would show the same aggressive first offers as par-
ticipants in the no-BATNA condition. This is exactly what 
we found. First offers were significantly lower in the 
weak-BATNA/BATNA-focus condition than in all other 
conditions, all ts(133) > 2.48, all ps < .015, all ds > 0.98. 
However, when negotiators focused on their target price, 
the differences among the BATNA conditions were 
reduced, and negotiators in the weak-BATNA condition 
made significantly higher first offers when they focused 
on their target than when they focused on their BATNA 
(see Table 1).
Final agreements. We predicted that final agreements 
would show the same pattern as first offers, and this is 
Table 1. Perceived Power, First-Offer Amounts, and Final-Agreement Amounts in Experiment 3
Measure
Negotiators focused on their BATNA Negotiators focused on their target price
No BATNA Weak BATNA Strong BATNA No BATNA Weak BATNA Strong BATNA
Perceived power 4.21a (1.22)  
[3.79, 4.63]
4.38a,b (0.99)  
[3.56, 4.80]
4.92b (0.83)  
[4.48, 5.36]
4.57a,b (0.87)  
[4.17, 4.97]
4.47a,b (1.04)  
[4.08, 4.87]
4.71a,b (1.14)  
[4.27, 5.16]
First-offer amount €730a,c (165)  
[648, 812]
€525b (244)  
[442, 606]
€750a,c (182)  
[664, 836]
€771a,c (193)  
[692, 850]
€665c (212)  
[588, 742]
€788a (183)  
[702, 874]
Final-agreement amount €619a (168)  
[564, 691]
€430b (193)  
[357, 503]
€658a (143)  
[582, 734]
€678a (145)  
[602, 754]
€581a (212)  
[513, 649]
€678a (180)  
[602, 754]
Note: The table presents means, with standard deviations in parentheses and 95% confidence intervals in square brackets. Within a row, means 
with different subscripts differ significantly from each other, p < .05. BATNA = best alternative to a negotiated agreement.
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what we found. Final agreements in the weak-BATNA/
BATNA-focus condition were significantly different from 
final agreements in all other conditions, all ts(133) > 2.99, 
all ps < .004, all ds > 1.04. However, when participants 
focused on their target price, the differences among the 
BATNA conditions were reduced, and negotiators with a 
weak BATNA achieved more profitable agreements when 
they focused on their target price than when they focused 
on their BATNA (see Fig. 5 and Table 1).
Mediation analysis. We hypothesized that the size of 
the first offer would explain why negotiators with a weak 
BATNA reached lower outcomes than those with no 
BATNA when negotiators focused on their alternative, 
but not when they focused on their target price. To test 
for mediation, we carried out a process analysis using a 
bootstrapping procedure with 5,000 iterations (Hayes, 
2013; Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007). As in Study 2, we 
designated the seller’s BATNA as the independent vari-
able (weak BATNA = 0; no BATNA = 1; n = 97), the 
seller’s first offer as the mediator, and the amount of the 
final agreement as the dependent variable. As predicted, 
when negotiators focused on their BATNA, the amount of 
the first offer mediated the effect of BATNA condition on 
the final agreement, 95% CI = [58.06, 263.53]. However, 
when negotiators focused on their target price instead, 
no mediation was found, 95% CI = [−4.35, 159.71] (see 
Fig. 6).
We also tested an alternative mediation model recom-
mended by Hayes and Preacher (2014), using a multicat-
egorical predictor (−5 for the weak-BATNA/BATNA-focus 
condition, 1 for all other conditions). Again, first-offer 
amount mediated the causal effect of the predictor on the 
amount of the final agreement, 95% CI = [9.70, 44.05]. 
Thus, our mediation analyses support our theory that not 
having an alternative frees negotiators up to make higher 
first offers and, as a consequence, achieve more profit-
able agreements.
Discussion
No-BATNA negotiators achieved more profitable agree-
ments than those with a weak BATNA. We established 
the role of anchoring in this effect using both mediation 
and moderation. The effect of BATNA condition on out-
comes was mediated by first-offer size and did not 
emerge when negotiators focused on their target price.
Experiment 4: The Opponent’s 
Alternatives
We next tested whether the liberating effect of having no 
alternative depends on the perception of the opponent’s 
alternatives. The strength of an opponent’s alternatives is 
important because negotiators with stronger alternatives 
are seen as more powerful (Pinkley, 1995). As a result, 
no-BATNA negotiators may lower their expectations and 
first offers if they think that their opponent has a strong 
BATNA. In our final study, we manipulated the strength 
of the opponent’s BATNA to test whether it would mod-
erate the previously observed effects.
Participants and design
Four hundred five individuals (mean age = 28.60 years, 
SD = 9.06; 35.8% female) recruited from Mechanical Turk 
participated in this experiment in exchange for $0.50. 
Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (own BATNA: 
no vs. weak) × 4 (opponent’s BATNA: ambiguous vs. no 
vs. weak vs. strong) between-subjects design. Twenty-six 
participants were excluded using the same criteria as in 
Experiment 1, which resulted in 379 observations.
Procedure
We used a modified version of the task in Experiment 1a. 
Participants always took the role of the seller.
Manipulations. The manipulation of own BATNA 
included only the two conditions of interest. Participants 
in the no-own-BATNA condition were told that they had 
no alternatives, whereas those in the weak-own-BATNA 
condition were informed that their alternative was $2.
The manipulation of opponent’s BATNA included the 
four conditions in Experiment 1b. Participants in the 
ambiguous-opponent-BATNA condition were not given 
any information about their opponent’s alternatives, 
those in the no-opponent-BATNA condition were told that 
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Fig. 5. Results from Experiment 3: mean amount of the final agree-
ment as a function of condition. Error bars indicate ±1 SEM. BATNA = 
best alternative to a negotiated agreement.
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their opponent did not have any alternatives, those in the 
weak-opponent-BATNA condition were told that their 
opponent’s alternative was to pay $15, and those in the 
strong-opponent-BATNA condition were told that their 
opponent’s alternative was to pay $5.
Measures. Subsequently, negotiators were prompted to 
make their first offer, complete our four-item power scale 
(α = .92), and respond to an attention check and demo-
graphics questions.
Results
Perceived power. Results were consistent with those in 
Experiments 1 to 3. Negotiators with no BATNA felt less 
powerful than those with a weak BATNA irrespective of 
the opponent’s BATNA, ts(371) > 2.92, ps < .004, ds > 
0.71 (see Table 2). A contrast analysis further revealed 
that negotiators generally felt less powerful in the strong-
opponent-BATNA condition (M = 4.93, SD = 1.28) com-
pared with all other opponent-BATNA conditions (M = 
5.24, SD = 1.12), t(375) = 2.24, p = .025, d = 0.27.
First offers. We predicted that negotiators in the weak-
own-BATNA conditions would make lower first offers 
than those in the no-own-BATNA conditions except when 
the opponent had a strong BATNA. This is exactly what 
we found (see Fig. 7 and Table 2): Negotiators with a 
weak BATNA made lower first offers than negotiators with 
no BATNA when their opponent’s BATNA was perceived 
to be weak, t(371) = 4.61, p < .001, d = 1.10; absent, 
t(371) = 5.50, p < .001, d = 0.80; or ambiguous, t(371) = 
5.69, p < .001, d = 1.08. However, when the opponent’s 
BATNA was strong, the difference between the weak- and 
no-own-BATNA conditions was much smaller and no lon-
ger significant, t(371) = 1.56, p = .12, d = 1.10.
Discussion
Experiment 4 demonstrated that the effect of having no 
BATNA on first offers remains robust regardless of oppo-
nents’ BATNAs except when negotiators perceive their 
opponents to have a strong BATNA: No-own-BATNA nego-
tiators no longer asked for more than weak-own-BATNA 
negotiators when their opponent had a strong BATNA.
Focus on BATNA
Focus on Target
0.75 (0.07)**/0.75 (0.07)**
79.64 (51.09)/0.42 (29.54)
105.62 (56.75)
Final
Agreement 
First Offer
BATNA
(Weak = 0; No = 1)
Final
Agreement 
First Offer
188.61 (53.38)**/28.20 (26.93)
0.81 (0.05)**/0.78 (0.06)**206.09 (61.42)*
BATNA
(Weak = 0; No = 1)
Fig. 6. Results from Experiment 3: first-offer amount as a mediator of the relationship between 
BATNA level (BATNA = best alternative to a negotiated agreement) and the size of the final 
agreement when negotiators focused on their BATNA (top panel) and their target price (bottom 
panel). The values along the paths are unstandardized regression coefficients, with standard 
errors in parentheses. Coefficients to the right of the slashes are simultaneous regression coef-
ficients. Asterisks indicate significant paths (*p < .01, **p < .001).
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General Discussion
The present research demonstrated that having no power 
can be better than having a little power. We found that 
the absence of alternatives can paradoxically liberate 
negotiators to make more aggressive first offers and 
achieve superior outcomes.
BATNAs are both a source of power and anchor val-
ues. The current experiments showed that the anchoring 
effect was stronger than the power effect. The results for 
first-offer amounts were consistent with the idea that 
BATNAs serve as anchors; negotiators made more aggres-
sive demands when alternatives were absent than when 
they were weak. Thus, the very same resource (BATNA) 
that enables individuals to achieve superior outcomes 
when it is strong is constraining if it is weak, and its com-
plete absence is liberating.
We demonstrated the role of anchoring through medi-
ation and moderation. First, the effects of having a weak 
rather than no BATNA on final agreements were consis-
tently mediated by first-offer amount. Second, when 
negotiators with a weak BATNA focused their attention 
on a countervailing anchor value—their target price—
first offers were no longer weak, and final outcomes were 
no longer worse.
Certain features of our paradigm provide exciting ave-
nues for future research. First, we always instructed focal 
negotiators to make the first offer. Although past research 
Table 2. Perceived Power and First-Offer Amounts in Experiment 4
Measure and 
negotiator’s BATNA
Opponent’s BATNA
Ambiguous No Weak Strong
Perceived power  
 No own BATNA 4.90a,c (1.06) [4.58, 5.22] 4.96a (0.96) [4.65, 5.26] 4.77a,c (1.34) [4.47, 5.08] 4.49c (1.29) [4.18, 4.81]
 Weak own BATNA 5.56b (0.78) [5.25, 5.87] 5.78b (0.94) [5.47, 6.10] 5.54b (1.18) [5.22, 5.86] 5.41b (1.09) [5.08, 5.73]
First-offer amount  
 No own BATNA $9.55a (5.60) [8.42, 10.68] $10.50a (6.96) [9.44, 10.69] $13.76b (2.49) [12.68, 14.84] $5.36c (1.52) [4.26, 6.46]
 Weak own BATNA $4.99c,d (2.30) [3.89, 6.09] $6.20d (2.83) [5.09, 7.31] $10.12a (3.98) [9.00, 11.24] $4.10c (0.44) [2.96, 5.25]
Note: The table presents means, with standard deviations in parentheses and 95% confidence intervals in square brackets. For each measure, 
means with different subscripts differ significantly from each other, p < .05. BATNA = best alternative to a negotiated agreement.
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Fig. 7. Results from Experiment 4: mean first-offer amount as a function of condition. Error bars indicate 
±1 SEM. Asterisks indicate significant differences between conditions (**p < .001). BATNA = best alterna-
tive to a negotiated agreement.
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suggests that negotiators without alternatives may be less 
likely to initiate the negotiation than are negotiators with 
strong alternatives (Magee et  al., 2007, Experiment 3), 
future studies should test whether no-BATNA negotiators 
are less likely than weak-BATNA negotiators to move 
first, for instance, by using a less controlled setting in 
which negotiators are free to move first or wait for their 
opponent to initiate the negotiation (see the Supplemental 
Material available online). Second, although none of the 
dyads in Experiments 2 and 3 reached an impasse, 
 follow-up studies could explore the conditions under 
which opponents could be offended and walk away from 
high first offers by no-BATNA negotiators (see 
Schweinsberg, Ku, Wang, & Pillutla, 2012). Third, BATNAs 
are especially consequential for negotiation outcomes 
when both parties are aware of them (Pinkley, 1995). 
Thus, future research could explore whether the findings 
from our final study extend to situations in which nego-
tiators are informed about each other’s BATNAs. Fourth, 
although we focused on BATNAs as the source of power, 
other forces, such as the relative contributions each party 
brings to the bargaining table, can further influence 
negotiators’ objective and subjective feelings of power 
(Kim & Fragale, 2005; Kim et  al., 2005). Thus, future 
research is needed to test whether our findings hold 
when power is not derived from one’s BATNA. Finally, 
another issue that future research might address is 
whether our findings extend to complex, multi-issue 
negotiations in which making the first offer can backfire 
(Loschelder, Swaab, Trötschel, & Galinsky, 2014; Pinkley, 
Neale, & Bennett, 1994).
Conclusion
The present research reinforces the idea that anchors 
have considerable weight in negotiations. Because alter-
natives not only offer power but also serve as anchors, a 
weak alternative can weigh down the size of a first offer 
and produce a worse outcome than having no alterna-
tives would have. As in Leigh Steinberg’s negotiation, 
having no power can be a liberating experience.
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report them here because power and final outcomes were our 
primary concern. There were no noteworthy effects on any of 
these measures.
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